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Abstract 
Why do politicians with strong local roots receive more electoral support? The mechanisms 
underlying this well-documented ‘friends and neighbors’ effect remain largely untested. 
Drawing on two population-based survey experiments fielded in Britain, we provide the first 
experimental test of a commonly posited cue-based explanation, which argues that voters use 
politicians’ local roots (descriptive localism) to make inferences about politicians’ likely 
actions in office (behavioral localism). Consistent with the cue-based account, we find that a 
politician’s local roots are less predictive of voter evaluations when voters have access to 
explicit information about aspects of the politician’s actual behavioral localism. However, we 
also find that voters’ positive reaction to local roots is only partially explained by a cue-based 
account where voters care only about are the aspects of behavioral localism tested in this 
paper. Our findings inform a normative debate concerning the implications of friends-and-
neighbors voting for democratic representation and accountability. 
 
Keywords: candidate localism; candidate evaluations; friends and neighbors; conjoint 
analysis 
 
Supplementary materials are available in an online appendix. Any data and materials 
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A persistent finding in political science is that politicians tend to receive additional electoral 
support in areas close to their place of birth or residence. While Key (1949) first documented 
this ‘friends and neighbors’ effect in the specific context of the Southern United States, 
subsequent studies have shown that it exists, not just elsewhere in the United States 
(Tatalovich 1975, Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983, Garand 1988, Rice and Macht 1987a, Rice and 
Macht 1987b, Bowler, Donovan and Snipp 1993, Gimpel et al. 2008, Meredith 2013a, 
Meredith 2013b), but also in a variety of other countries around the world, including Ireland 
(Gallagher 1980, Górecki and Marsh 2012, Górecki and Marsh 2014, Weeks 2008), Australia 
(Studlar and McAllister 1996), Canada (Cutler 2002, Blais et al. 2003), Britain (Arzheimer 
and Evans 2012, 2014), Estonia (Tavits 2010), Germany (Jankowski 2016) and Norway 
(Cox, Fiva and Smith 2016, Fiva and Halse 2016).  
 The electoral appeal of local roots raises important normative concerns. Key himself 
was troubled, arguing that elections in which a candidate can ‘gain support, not primarily for 
what he stands for or because of his capacities, but because of where he lives’ (Key 1949: 41) 
are unlikely to deliver policy representation and accountability for performance (see also 
Stokes and Miller 1962: 546). In his eyes, the existence of friends-and-neighbors voting 
‘justifies a diagnosis of low voter-interest in public issues and a susceptibility to control by 
the irrelevant appeal to support the home-town boy’ (Key 1949: 37).  
 To know whether Key’s pessimistic assessment is valid, we need first to understand 
why the friends-and-neighbors effect occurs. Yet most existing studies focus on establishing 
the preference for a local politician rather than testing theoretical explanations for it. The only 
theory to be explicitly tested so far posits an indirect mechanism: that friends-and-neighbors 
voting arises not because voters actively consider local roots when evaluating politicians, but 
because voters tend to have more information about politicians with local roots due to the 
way such information is diffused through local social networks and local media (Bowler et al. 
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1993, Johnston et al. 2016). However, recent experimental evidence shows that voters still 
tend to prefer politicians with local roots to those without even when presented with the same 
amount of information about both (Campbell and Cowley 2014). This suggests that local 
roots have an important direct effect on voter evaluations.  
 This paper empirically evaluates an important potential explanation for the direct 
effect of local roots on voter evaluations of a politician: voters rationally use local roots as a 
low-cost cue for making inferences about a politician’s ‘behavioral localism’, i.e. the extent 
to which the politician acts in line with the interests and wishes of the voter themselves, and 
others in their locality. This explanation is frequently suggested, but has not been explicitly 
tested (e.g., Gimpel et al. 2008, Tavits 2010, Jankowski 2016). If voters use local roots as 
cues, friends-and-neighbors voting does not in fact preclude policy representation or 
performance accountability (for a similar argument concerning party cues, see Lupia 1994). 
Of course, this is only the case to the extent that (1) local roots cues are accurate and (2) 
voters update their beliefs with more detailed information about a politician’s behavior where 
it becomes available.  
 To assess this theoretical explanation, we draw on evidence from two population-
based survey experiments fielded in Britain, where the evidence for friends-and-neighbors 
voting is clear (Arzheimer and Evans 2012, Arzheimer and Evans 2014, Evans et al. 2017, 
Campbell and Cowley 2014). Study 1 explicitly tests the cue-based explanation for the 
friends-and-neighbors effect. We use a paired profiles factorial vignette design, asking 
respondents to rate two hypothetical Members of Parliament (MPs) and randomly varying (1) 
whether each MP has weak or strong local roots and (2) the presence of additional explicit 
information about each MP’s level of behavioral localism, characterized here in terms of an 
MP’s constituency service and trustee/delegate role orientation. The cue-based account 
suggests that local roots become less predictive of MP ratings when respondents receive 
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information about the MP's behavioral localism. This is because respondents then no longer 
have to rely on local roots to make inferences concerning those aspects of MP behavior about 
which they now have explicit information. Our results are consistent with this expectation, 
and thus provide clear evidence for the cue-based account.  
 Nevertheless, we also find in Study 1 that local roots continue to have a notable effect 
on evaluations of a politician even in the presence of behavioral information. In Study 2 
therefore we begin to examine whether this is because voters use local roots as a cue for 
aspects of MP behavior not mentioned in the treatments for behavioral localism used in Study 
1. We do so, in Study 2, by drawing on a conjoint survey experiment where voters again 
evaluate MPs who vary in their level of local roots, but where voters also receive more 
extensive information about MPs’ behavior and preferences, including party affiliation, 
ideology, policy interests, constituency service and role orientation. We find that even with 
this wide range of information about aspects of the MP’s behavioral localism, local roots 
continue to have a positive impact on voters’ evaluations of an MP. Thus, a cue-based 
account, where voters use local roots to make inferences about the set of MP attributes 
included in this experiment, can provide only a partial explanation for the friends-and-
neighbors effect. This implies that voters are using local roots as a cue for a still broader set 
of MP attributes or that part of the friends-and-neighbors effect is explained by an alternative 
mechanism, which we discuss further below. 
 
Local roots as a signal of behavioral localism 
Such is the weight of evidence that local roots have positive electoral effects that some 
consider the friends-and-neighbors effect “a natural order, bordering on banality” (Pedersen, 
Kjaer and Eliassen 2007). Yet although many studies offer informed discussions of the likely 
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causes of the friends-and-neighbors effect, few provide evidence concerning possible 
explanations.  
The most frequent explanation put forward in the literature is that, rather than having 
a preference for local roots, voters use the ‘localness’ of a politician (descriptive localism) to 
infer whether that politician will act in the substantive interests of the local community 
(behavioral localism) (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen 2005, Tavits 2010). Mansbridge 
(1999: 629), for example, argues that local roots signal ‘shared experience, which one might 
reasonably expect to promote a representative's accurate representation of and commitment to 
constituent interests’.  
 Voters may plausibly associate local roots with multiple aspects of legislator 
behavior. In the UK context, which we focus on here, three aspects of politicians’ behavior 
may be particularly strongly linked to local roots in voters’ minds: constituency service, role 
interpretation, and ideological congruence. 
 First, voters may infer that politicians with local roots are more likely to be good 
constituency servants. There is considerable evidence that British voters view MPs’ 
constituency service activities – case and project work aimed at helping individual or groups 
of constituents in their interactions with government (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987) – as 
one of their most important roles (Vivyan and Wagner 2016, Johnson and Rosenblatt 2007, Campbell and Lovenduski 
2015). Voters may believe that MPs with local ties are more emotionally connected to the 
constituency and better informed about constituents’ needs (Shugart et al. 2005). 
Second, voters may expect politicians with local roots to listen more to local people 
when forming positions on policy. People prefer politicians to act as delegates rather than 
trustees (Carman 2006, Doherty 2013, Vivyan and Wagner 2016); if MPs with local roots 
have stronger ties to the area, they might be subject to stronger social pressures to act as 
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delegates. This may mean that ‘it is more credible for a candidate with local roots than for 
one without to claim to be a local servant in national decision-making’ (Tavits 2010: 217).  
Third, voters may believe that politicians with local roots are more likely to share 
their ideological outlook. There is sizeable regional variation in political preferences in many 
countries (Rodden 2010). If voters assume that locally-rooted MPs have similar backgrounds 
and are therefore more likely to share their views, they may use local roots as a heuristic for 
ideological congruence. This logic might also lead voters to believe that an MP with local 
roots will share their policy priorities (Shugart et al. 2005, Tavits 2010).  
 In sum, local roots may serve as a low-cost cue that voters use to infer politicians’ 
likely behavioral localism (Popkin 1991). A testable implication of this theory is as follows: 
if a voter takes local roots into account because they serve as a cue for a politician’s likely 
behavioral localism, then the voter should take local roots into account less when they receive 
explicit information concerning one or more aspects of the politician’s actual behavioral 
localism. This is because the voter no longer needs to rely on local roots as a cue for the 
behavior about which they now have direct information. Our hypothesis is therefore that the 
effect of descriptive localism is weakened when voters receive direct information about 
politicians’ behavioral localism. 
Alternative explanations for friends-and-neighbors effects could include that voters 
value the local-ness of their political representative in and of itself (Lewis-Beck and Rice 
1983). Consistent with Key’s pessimistic assessment and prior research establishing the 
importance of group identities for political behavior (for a review, see Achen and Bartels 
2016, chapter 8), this would suggest that friends-and-neighbors voting is driven by a voter’s 
psychological bias toward politicians from the same geographic “group” as themselves 
(Tajfel 1970, 1982). Such an account would predict that the effects of local roots on voter 
evaluations should vary positively with the strength of local attachments, rather than 
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depending on the presence or absence of information about behavioral localism. An 
alternative account posits that the friends-and-neighbors effect arises due to indirect 
mechanisms, either because voters receive more information about local than about non-local 
candidates due to the way electoral information diffuses through local social and media 
networks (Bowler et al. 1993, Johnston et al. 2016), or because local candidates are able to 
better mobilize local activists (Rice and Macht 1987b). Such an account does not involve 
information about a politician’s local roots having any direct effect on voter evaluations of 
that politician.  
  
Research design 
To examine the cue-based account of friends-and-neighbors voting, we rely on population-
based survey experiments fielded in the UK. Traditionally, party-based electoral competition 
was the key feature of elections in the UK, but there is increasing evidence of candidate 
effects. Despite lacking a residency requirement for its Westminster elections, there is a 
widespread acknowledgement within the political parties themselves that a ‘local candidate’ 
can be an electoral asset – hence claims of candidate localness are extremely frequently used 
as a campaign tool – and there has been a rise in the proportion of MPs with roots in their 
constituency (Rush 2001, Childs and Cowley 2011). Moreover, the existence of a friends-
and-neighbors effect has been repeatedly demonstrated in recent observational (Arzheimer 
and Evans, 2012, 2014; Evans et al, 2017) and experimental studies (Campbell and Cowley, 
2014) in the UK. We discuss the extent to which conclusions drawn from the UK are 
generalizable further in the conclusion.   
 We use an experimental approach because, although observational studies have 
undoubted benefits regarding external validity, an experimental approach has two important 
advantages for present purposes. First, it is difficult in observational studies to identify the 
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effect of local roots on voter support for politicians because politicians with local roots may 
be more likely to run (or to be selected as a party candidate) in certain strategic contexts 
(Shugart et al. 2005), and more likely to behave in ways that please constituents (Carozzi and 
Repetto 2016, Cox et al. 2016). In our experimental approach, local roots are exogenous by 
design. Second, accurately identifying the effect of information – i.e. what voters know about 
the behavior of a politician – is crucial for conducting a precise test of our hypothesis, yet it is 
difficult in observational studies to fully measure and control for the information voters are 
exposed to about a politician. Survey measures of media exposure or candidate knowledge 
contain measurement error. More importantly, to the extent that the indirect friends-and-
neighbors mechanism proposed by Bowler et al. (1993) holds, voters’ actual levels of 
knowledge about a politician are likely to be endogenously related to a politician’s local roots 
because local politicians may accumulate more local media exposure. By providing 
information experimentally, we can ensure that what voters get told about a politician is 
uncorrelated with whether the politician has local roots. In addition, in observational studies 
different types of voter, depending on their local networks, might have access to more or less 
information about a politician, and this may account for heterogeneous reactions to local 
roots. An experimental approach is thus useful for isolating the influence of localism in a 
situation of controlled information provision. 
 
Study 1 
In our first study, we use a vignette experiment to test whether the presence of information 
concerning politicians’ behavioral localism conditions the effects of their local roots in the 
manner predicted by the cue-based account. The experiment was fielded in August 2016 to a 
sample of 5,203 participants, designed to be representative of the British adult population in 
terms of age, gender, social class and type of newspaper readership, drawn from the YouGov 
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online panel.
1
 We asked respondents to evaluate hypothetical MPs based on short vignettes 
which varied in terms of (1) the strength of the MPs’ local roots and (2) the quantity and 
quality of information regarding the MPs’ behavior in office. If the cue-based explanation 
holds, then the experimental effect of the strength of local roots should be lower where voters 
have behavioral information and therefore do not need to rely on local roots to make 
inferences about an MP’s likely behavior.  
 Each respondent was presented with two vignettes describing hypothetical Members 
of Parliament called Nick Cowley and Philip Campbell. We presented respondents with 
incumbent MPs so that we could inform respondents about what an MP does in office, i.e. 
their behavioral localism. Recent research suggests that paired vignette designs improve 
respondent engagement and external validity (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto 
2015). Our main focus in the experiment is on the first MP (Nick) and how varying his 
attributes affects respondents’ relative support for him over Philip. The baseline preference 
for Nick compared to Philip is irrelevant to the study.  
  [Table 1 about here] 
Our experiment takes the form of a 2×3 factorial design, described in Table 1 (and in 
Appendix A). The two local roots treatments vary only the strength of Nick’s local roots. 
Nick either ‘grew up and lives outside your local area’ or ‘grew up and lives in your local 
area’. This is realistic: in 2015, almost a third of MPs elected in the general election did not 
live in their constituency and historically, this is not an unusually high proportion (Norton 
and Wood 1993). Philip’s local roots were fixed at a moderate level (‘originally lived in 
another part of the country and moved to your local area five years ago’) across conditions. 
                                                          
1
 Compared to a face-to-face survey, YouGov samples yield only small differences in the 
distribution of most key explanatory variables and in regression models for political decisions 
(Sanders et al. 2007).  
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The three behavioral information treatments vary whether respondents receive any 
information about the behavioral localism of both MPs and, where such information is 
provided, the nature of Nick’s behavior. We operationalized behavioral localism in terms of 
two influential attributes (Vivyan and Wagner 2016): the relative amount of time the MP 
spends on constituency and national policy work; and whether the MP takes a trustee- or 
delegate-style approach in deciding on policy positions. Importantly, local roots plausibly 
serve as a heuristic for both attributes: voters could plausibly infer that MPs with local roots 
would spend more time on constituency service and/or listen more closely to constituents’ 
views when deciding their policy positions. Respondents receiving the ‘no behavioral 
information’ treatment were told nothing about the behavioral localism of either Nick or 
Philip. Respondents receiving the ‘low behavioral localism’ treatment were told that Nick 
spends most of his time working on national policy-related matters in Parliament and adopts a 
trustee-style approach to policy representation. Respondents receiving the ‘high behavioral 
localism’ treatment were told that Nick spends most of his time working on constituency 
issues and that he adopts a delegate-style approach to policy representation. In the two latter 
treatments, Philip was characterized as moderate in terms of behavioral localism, spending a 
moderate amount of time on both constituency and national policy work and adopting a 
trustee-style approach to policy representation. In this experiment, our behavioral information 
treatments do not contain information about MP ideology, another potential attribute for 
which local roots are plausibly be used as a cue. This is because the primary purpose of the 
experiment was to detect whether some fairly minimal behavioural information reduces the 
effect of local roots, in line with the cue-based account.
2
   
                                                          
2
 Including information about MP ideology would also complicate measurement of whether a 
respondent is assigned to a high or low behavioral localism information condition: whereas it 
is reasonable to assume that all respondents would consider higher levels of constituency 
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We test our expectation by comparing the effect of local roots (the first varying 
attribute) across levels of behavioral localism (the second varying attribute). If the cue-based 
explanation holds, the effect of local roots should be weaker when behavioral information is 
provided, irrespective of whether this indicates high or low behavioral localism.  
 The vignettes in all conditions also contained background information about the MPs 
to create a reasonably realistic context where voters receive rounded information about MPs 
and thus need not pay attention to local roots or behavioral localism. The values of these 
additional attributes were fixed across experimental conditions. They were also chosen to be 
unobjectionable, which is important as these attributes should not affect the size of the 
treatment effects. This would potentially endanger the generalizability of our findings, 
although not the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation. We also included positive 
statements about the MPs’ honesty and competence to ensure that voters did not dismiss 
either MP as completely undesirable. We did not include party labels but did tell voters in a 
preamble that both MPs were from the same party (information on partisanship and ideology 
is included in Study 2). As an example, a respondent in the ‘strong local roots’/ ‘no 
behavioral information’ condition would have seen the following vignettes: 
 
Nick Cowley is 46 years old. He grew up and lives in your local area. Before 
becoming involved in politics he was an accountant. He is widely regarded as 
clever, hard-working, and straight-talking. In terms of policies, he is interested in 
health and pensions. He spends on average 4 days of a working week working on 
local constituency issues and the remaining 1 day reviewing and working on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
service and a constituency delegate role orientation as constituting higher levels of MP 
behavioral localism, reactions to information about an MP’s ideology will depend on the 
respondents’ own ideological preferences. 
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national policies in Parliament. When considering policy matters, he mainly 
thinks about his constituents' views. He studied biology at university. In his free 
time, he likes watching films and reading fiction. He is married with two children. 
 
Philip Campbell is 53 years old. He originally lived in another part of the country 
and moved to your local area five years ago. Before becoming involved in politics 
he was a teacher. He is widely regarded as diligent and honest. In terms of 
policies, he is interested in education and transport. He spends on average 3 days 
of a working week working on local constituency issues and the remaining 2 day 
reviewing and working on national policies in Parliament. When considering 
policy matters, he mainly thinks about his own personal views. He studied 
physics at university. In his free time, he likes running and going to the theatre. 
He is married with three children. 
  
We asked respondents: ‘On a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 means very unhappy 
and 10 means very happy, how happy or unhappy would you be to have each person as your 
Member of Parliament?’3 Our dependent variable, Yi, is respondent i's relative rating of Nick: 
                                                          
3
 We could also have asked respondents to choose between the two MPs. However, a 
reduction in the estimated effect of local roots when behavioral information is provided might 
then occur simply because such information has a ‘crowding out’ effect. For example, 
constituency-focused MPs could be so well liked by respondents that they are almost always 
selected over the moderate alternative regardless of local ties. Using ratings reduces the risk 
of this type of mechanical effect. We report a simulation of a binary choice in Appendix B.  
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the 0-10 rating of Nick minus that of Philip.
4
 We expect the magnitude of the effect of local 
roots to be lower among respondents who receive information about the MPs’ behavioral 
localism. We therefore estimate the following model via OLS: 
Yi = α + β1Di
local
 + β2Di
info
 + β3(Di
local
·Di
info
)+ εi,    (1) 
where Di
local 
indicates whether the respondent received the strong local roots treatment (1) or 
not (0), Di
info 
indicates whether a respondent received any information about MPs’ (high or 
low) behavioral localism (1) or not (0), and εi is an error term. The cue-based explanation of 
friends-and-neighbors voting predicts that the provision of behavioral information reduces the 
effect of the strong local roots treatment. Thus β3 should be negative. 
We also test whether the effects of local roots are attenuated differently when an MP 
exhibits high or low levels of behavioral localism by estimating the following model:  
 Yi = α + β1Di
local
 + β2Di
low
 + β3Di
high
 + β4(Di
local
·Di
low
) + β5(Di
local
·Di
high
)+ εi,  (2) 
where Di
low
 and Di
high
 indicate low behavioral localism and high behavioral localism, 
respectively. Parameters β4 and β5 compare the effect of local roots in the presence of each of 
these two behavioral localism treatments to those in the absence of any behavioral localism 
information. Again, we expect both parameters to be negative and statistically significant.  
 Table 2 presents estimates of equations 1 and 2 with and without controls for 
pretreatment measures of: gender, age (18-24, 25-49, 50-64, 65 and above), education 
(Levels 1/2, Level 3, Level 4/5, No qualifications/Other/Unknown, according to the 
International Standard Classification of Education) and social grade (AB, C1, C2 or DE).
5
 
We use robust standard errors.  
                                                          
4
 Support for the cue-based explanation is stronger if we use the raw 0-10 ratings of Nick as 
the dependent variable; the results are presented in Appendix B. 
5
 In Appendix C we perform randomization and balance checks using these respondent 
variables. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 In all models, the main effect of the local roots treatment is positive and significant: 
when respondents receive no information about behavioral localism, Nick’s relative rating 
increases (relative to Philip) when he is characterized as having strong rather than no local 
roots. The negative and significant interaction term in Models 1 and 2 shows that, in line with 
the cue-based account of friends-and-neighbors voting, the positive effect of local roots on 
Nick’s relative rating is attenuated when voters receive any information about the behavioral 
localism of the two MPs. The negative and significant interaction coefficients on both 
interaction terms in each of Models 3 and 4 shows that the positive effect of local roots is 
attenuated both when respondents are told that Nick is high in behavioral localism and when 
they are told that he is low in behavioral localism. 
 Based on Model 4, Figure 1a presents the predicted value of Nick’s relative ratings 
for different combinations of the local roots (y-axis) and behavioral localism (panels) 
treatments. Comparing the same dot across panels shows that, conditional on a given level of 
local roots, Nick’s relative rating is always higher when he is characterized as high in 
behavioral localism (bottom panel) compared to when he is characterized as low in 
behavioral localism (second panel) or when voters receive no behavioral localism 
information (top panel). The difference between the two dots in each panel is the treatment 
effect of local roots for each behavioral information condition.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Figure 1b plots these treatment effects directly to show more clearly how they vary by 
behavioral information condition. Having local roots increases Nick’s relative rating by 0.76 
points when respondents receive no behavioral localism information (top panel). This effect 
is reduced by around a third when respondents receive behavioral localism information: to 
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0.45 when Nick is presented as low in behavioral localism (second panel), and to 0.52 when 
Nick is presented as high in behavioral localism (third panel).  
 This experiment thus provides evidence that, consistent with our expectation, the 
effects of local roots on voter evaluations of politicians are reduced when voters receive 
direct information concerning behaviors about which they might otherwise use local roots as 
a cue. Furthermore, we tested whether a voter’s reaction to MP local roots depends on the 
voter’s local political context and found little evidence to support such a claim.6 Note, 
however, that although information about behavioral localism accounts for a substantial 
portion (around a third) of the baseline effect of local roots, the effect of local roots is still 
positive and significant in every row of Figure 1b. Thus, being local still has a positive 
impact even when voters know a reasonable amount about a politician’s behavioral localism.  
 
Study 2 
In Study 1 local roots continued to have a positive – albeit diminished – effect on voter 
evaluations of a politician even in the presence of explicit information about key aspects of 
the politician’s behavioral localism. This may be because there are other salient aspects of 
behavioral localism which are not mentioned in the Study 1 treatments and for which voters 
are using local roots as a cue.  
 We present evidence concerning this possibility by drawing on the results of a 
conjoint analysis survey experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). In this 
experiment we again asked respondents to consider pairs of politicians who varied in their 
level of local roots. However, in contrast to Study 1, respondents in this experiment (a) 
always received information about the behavioral localism of the politician and (b) received 
                                                          
6
 In Appendix D we test whether a voter’s reaction to MP local roots depends on the voter’s 
local political context; we find little evidence to support such a claim.  
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information about additional (and plausibly salient) aspects of the politicians’ behavioral 
localism, including information on the politicians’ partisanship and their political preferences. 
Because of (a), this experiment does not directly test the cue-based account’s prediction that 
the impact of local roots varies conditional on the presence or absence of information about 
behavioral information. Rather, this experiment is informative because of (b): it shows for the 
first time whether the effect of politician local roots on voter evaluations persists, or is instead 
‘explained away’, when voters have immediate access to the richer set of information about a 
politician’s behavioral localism examined here.7 If the effect persists to a substantial degree 
in this experiment, this provides evidence against the notion that local roots simply act as a 
cue for the broader set of politician attributes considered here. This would mean that local 
roots serve as a cue for a still broader set of politician attributes, or that the cue-based theory 
may only provide a partial account of the friends-and-neighbors effect, with the remainder 
explained by alternative mechanisms relating to in-group bias or an intrinsic preference for 
descriptive representation.  
The survey experiment was fielded to 1,719 respondents between 4 and 5 February 
2015, again through YouGov. After a short introduction, we asked respondents to choose 
between a pair of hypothetical MPs. Each MP was characterized by six attributes, each of 
which varied randomly across two to four possible levels. MPs differed in whether they had 
                                                          
7
 Note that this is distinct from the contribution of previous observational studies which 
cannot show whether voters react positively to local roots because they lack information 
about the behavioral localism of the candidate or because they possess that information but 
still value local roots for another reason. It is also distinct from the contribution of previous 
experimental studies (e.g., Campbell and Cowley 2014) which only test the effect of local 
roots in the presence of a more limited set of information about politician behavioral localism 
(which does not include constituency service, role orientation or politician ideology). 
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local roots and also in the depth of any local roots. We included four attributes to capture 
behavioral localism. First, we provided information on how MPs allocated time to 
constituency work and national policy work, but with a greater variation in focus than in 
Study 1. Second, we provided information on role orientation, in which we specified whether 
each MP paid more attention to his or her own personal views (trustee), to those of the 
constituents (delegate) or those of the party when thinking about national policy. Third, 
moving beyond Study 1, to capture the policy preferences potentially signaled by local roots, 
we captured ideological congruence by providing information on the party of the MP and 
whether the MP was a centrist or more extreme member of their party. To capture policy 
emphasis, we described the main political interests of the MP as either education and health 
policy or economic policy and taxation; in the UK, the former are more local than the latter, 
as they are related to debates concerning local schools and hospitals. Finally, we also varied 
the gender of the MP in order to make the profiles more realistic. The precise wording used is 
presented in Appendix E. A screenshot is shown in Figure 2. MP attribute values were 
assigned randomly and independently. For our outcome variable we asked respondents: 
‘Based on this information, which ONE of these two MPs would you prefer to have as your 
MP?’8 A response was required, with no ‘don’t know’ option. Respondents were presented 
with a total of five choice tasks.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
For each respondent, we have two observations per choice task, one for each 
hypothetical MP they are presented with. Hence, we have 1,719 x 2 x 5 = 17,190 
observations. Our quantity of interest is the average marginal component effect (AMCE) for 
                                                          
8
 Unlike in Study 1, ‘crowding out’ is less of a concern in Study 2, as all respondents received 
the same amount of information about MPs. Hence, the simple binary choice question should 
not be problematic for Study 2. 
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each value of the MP attributes. The AMCE is the effect on the probability of an MP being 
chosen of a particular value of an attribute compared to a baseline value of that attribute, 
averaging over all possible values of all other attributes and all attributes of the other MP 
included in the choice task (Hainmueller et al. 2014). Since our design employs completely 
independent randomization, we can estimate AMCEs using simple differences-in-means 
obtained via OLS models where the predictors are dummy variables for the values of the 
attributes. Standard errors are clustered by respondent.
9
  
Figure 3 shows the population AMCE estimates for each level of each attribute, 
relative to the baseline level of that attribute. The bars represent corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
 For local roots, the baseline value is an MP who lives outside the constituency. The 
three other attribute levels are whether the MP moved to the local areas five years ago, 
twenty years ago, or whether the MP grew up and lives in the local area. MPs with these three 
attribute levels all have some minimal level of local roots and are clearly preferred to MPs 
who live outside of the constituency: those MPs with at least a minimal level of local roots 
are between 10 and 13 per cent more likely to be chosen by respondents in the choice tasks.  
 Note that, like the previous experiment, the conjoint analyses setup gives respondents 
the opportunity to ignore a characteristic if they deem it unimportant relative to other choice 
attributes. Yet the magnitude of the local roots effects are among the largest across all 
attributes in the experiment. Thus, in line with Study 1 it seems that British voters have a 
substantial residual preference for an MP with some local roots, even in a context where they 
have clear information about other attributes of the MP for which local roots act as a proxy 
                                                          
9
 In Appendix F we show that the experiment satisfies a series of standard conjoint analysis 
diagnostics. 
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and where they receive the same level of information about MPs with local roots as those 
without local roots.
10
 In Appendix G we present indicative evidence that respondents’ 
strength of local identification only weakly influences friends-and-neighbors voting.   
 In terms of the depth of an MP’s local roots, MPs who moved to the local area twenty 
years ago or grew up and live in the area were both slightly more likely to be preferred by 
respondents than MPs who moved to the area around five years ago. However, these 
differences are not statistically significant and are small in magnitude (between 2.5 and 3 per 
cent) compared to the differences between MPs who live elsewhere in the country and all 
other types of MPs. In other words, if an MP has some minimal level of local roots and if 
other relevant information about the behavioral localism of the MP is available, voters do not 
attach much additional value to an MP having particularly deep local roots. 
Because MPs in Study 2 are characterized by multiple attributes whose levels vary 
independently, we can model interactions to test whether the effect of local ties is conditional 
on the level of other attributes. When we perform F-tests for interactions between MP local 
ties and each remaining attribute in the experiment, we find that none are significant at the 
0.05 level. This is consistent with the cue-based account, which posits that what matters for 
the predictive power of local roots is the presence or absence of behavioral information – not 
the nature of that information once it is present. 
     
Discussion and conclusion 
                                                          
10
 In Appendices H and I we examine the effects of party label and ideological proximity. 
Appendix H shows a similar pattern of effects whether the MPs are from the same- or 
different-parties. Appendix I shows that when we control for the interaction between the 
party/ideology treatment and respondent ideology, the average effects of MP local roots 
remain substantively unchanged from those reported above.   
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Many researchers have speculated that voters use politicians’ local roots as a cue to make 
inferences regarding their likely behavior or character, and that this mechanism is central to 
explaining the persistent cross-national friends-and-neighbors voting phenomenon. In this 
article, we provided the first experimental test for this claim. Consistent with this cue-based 
explanation, Study 1 showed that voters’ place less weight on a politician having local roots 
when they also receive information about the politician’s level of behavioral localism. 
Empirically, providing information about politician constituency service orientation and 
constituency policy representation reduced the effect of local roots by about a third.  
 That said, Study 2 showed that even if voters are provided with a rich array of 
information about politicians’ behavior and ideological positioning, the effect of local roots 
remained positive and notable. In this sense, voters’ positive reaction to local roots is not 
fully explained by a cue-based account where voters care only about are the behaviors and 
attributes considered in this paper. What might account for the local roots effects that we 
have observed but which are left un-explained by the particular mechanisms considered in 
this paper? 
First, it may be that voters use local connections to make inferences about other 
politician behaviors and attributes in addition to those tested in this paper. For example, 
voters may also use local roots as a cue for trustworthiness. As Gimpel et al. (2008) argue, 
“trust is founded on the basis of common or shared interest” (234), and voters may perceive 
politicians with local roots as more socially invested in their community. Future research 
could extend the experimental designs used in this paper to test whether voters are using local 
roots as a cue for additional politician attributes, perhaps by asking respondents to rate 
politicians on various dimensions (such as trustworthiness and accessibility), and comparing 
the effects of local roots on these different dimensions. It could also further test the cue-based 
account by examining whether voters in different political systems use politician local roots 
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as a cue for different behavioral attributes depending on which ones are most salient in that 
system. Whilst the cue-based account should be generalizable in the sense that the key 
underlying logic of the account – that voters use politician local roots to make inferences 
about likely politician behavior – does not vary across countries, we may still find differences 
in how this manifests itself. American voters, for example, might be more likely than British 
voters to use local roots to make inferences about a legislator’s likely commitment to ensure 
pork-barrel spending in their region (a behavior which is less salient in Britain because of the 
lack of influence individual legislators can have on budget allocations).  
Second, friends-and-neighbors voting may arise because voters exhibit an in-group 
bias towards local candidates and an out-group bias against non-local candidates. In 
Appendix G, for example, we present preliminary evidence from Study 2 that, contrary to an 
identity-based account, respondents’ strength of local identification only weakly conditions 
the friends-and-neighbors effect. However, further research on this is clearly needed. In 
particular, more detailed and fine-grained measures of identities as well as experiments that 
prime local identities could provide further insight (see, e.g., Huddy and Khatib 2007).  
Third, still other mechanisms may also explain parts of the effects of local roots seen 
in our experiments. For example, it could be that voters perceive politicians with roots in the 
area they represent as simply more legitimate than politicians who do not have such roots, in 
the sense that it is more “appropriate, proper and just” (Tyler 2006, 376) for people to 
represented by a person from their local area. One way future research might test a 
mechanism such as this could be to examine whether the effect of local roots persists when 
voters are asked to evaluate politicians who are explicitly described as representing 
constituencies quite different to the one in which the voter lives. 
 It is important to restate that the evidence in this paper solely concerns the direct 
effect that local roots have on voter evaluations of a politician. By design, our experimental 
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approach precluded an indirect effect of local roots, such as potential network, campaigning, 
mobilization and name recognition effects. Doing so allowed us to better isolate and assess 
the cue- and identity-based accounts, which have so far remained untested in the friends-and-
neighbors literature. In other words, we can be sure that the effect of friends-and-neighbors 
voting is not solely due to indirect effects. Equally, however, it should be borne in mind that 
indirect effects may of course take on significant importance in real elections, and future 
friends-and-neighbors research would ideally attempt to study direct and indirect mechanisms 
alongside each other, to assess their relative importance. Research on real electoral races – 
whether observational or experimental – may well be crucial, since it is difficult to see how in 
a survey experiment one could adequately and realistically induce some of the indirect effects 
discussed above, many of which involve processes that evolve over multiple social 
interactions over a relatively long period of time.  
 We began this article by outlining the normative debate surrounding the implications 
of friends-and-neighbors voting for the quality of voter decision-making. Key was skeptical: 
to him, this phenomenon indicated the impact of irrelevant considerations. In contrast, we 
have shown that cue usage is part of the reason why voters support candidates with local 
roots. Whether this is to be welcomed depends on the accuracy of the cue, which depends in 
turn on the extent to which locally-rooted MPs do in fact engage in behavioral localism more 
than others. Recent work on Estonia (Tavits 2010), Norway (Fiva and Halse 2016) and Italy 
(Carozzi and Repetto 2016) shows that local roots affect the way MPs behave in office. 
Cross-national evidence also indicates that locally-rooted MPs are more independent from 
their party (Tavits 2009, Tavits 2010). Yet, locally-rooted MPs may also shirk their duties if 
voters use local roots as a cue rather than evaluating MP behavior. The normative 
implications of our findings on friends-and-neighbors voting are thus nuanced and highlight 
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the need for further work examining not just voter decision-making but also politician 
behavior.  
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Table 1. Design of experimental vignettes, Study 1 
 No behavioral information High behavioral localism Low behavioral localism 
No local 
roots 
Nick 
Vignette 1 
Local roots: “grew up and lives outside your local 
area” 
Behavior: Nothing 
Vignette 3 
Local roots: “grew up and lives outside your local area” 
Behavior: “spends on average 4 days of a working week 
working on local constituency issues and the remaining 1 
day reviewing and working on national policies in 
Parliament. When considering policy matters, he mainly 
thinks about his constituents' views” 
Vignette 5 
Local roots: “grew up and lives outside your local area” 
Behavior: “spends on average 4 days of a working week 
reviewing and working on national policies in 
Parliament and the remaining 1 day working on local 
constituency issues. When considering policy matters, he 
mainly thinks about his own personal views” 
Philip 
Local roots: “originally lived in another part of the 
country and moved to your local area five years ago” 
Behavior: Nothing 
Local roots: “originally lived in another part of the 
country and moved to your local area five years ago” 
Behavior: “spends on average 3 days of a working week 
working on local constituency issues and the remaining 2 
day reviewing and working on national policies in 
Parliament. When considering policy matters, he mainly 
takes into consideration his own personal views” 
Local roots: “originally lived in another part of the 
country and moved to your local area five years ago” 
Behavior: “spends on average 3 days of a working week 
working on local constituency issues and the remaining 2 
day reviewing and working on national policies in 
Parliament. When considering policy matters, he mainly 
takes into consideration his own personal views” 
Strong 
local 
roots 
Nick 
 
Vignette 2 
Local roots: “grew up and lives in your local area”  
Behavior: Nothing 
Vignette 4 
Local roots: “grew up and lives in your local area”  
Behavior: “spends on average 4 days of a working 
week working on local constituency issues and the 
remaining 1 day reviewing and working on national 
policies in Parliament. When considering policy 
matters, he mainly thinks about his constituents' views” 
Vignette 6 
Local roots: “grew up and lives in your local area”  
Behavior: “spends on average 4 days of a working 
week working on local constituency issues and the 
remaining 1 day reviewing and working on national 
policies in Parliament. When considering policy 
matters, he mainly thinks about his constituents' views” 
Philip 
Local roots: “originally lived in another part of the 
country and moved to your local area five years ago” 
Behavior: Nothing 
Local roots: “originally lived in another part of the 
country and moved to your local area five years ago” 
Behavior: “spends on average 3 days of a working week 
working on local constituency issues and the remaining 2 
day reviewing and working on national policies in 
Parliament. When considering policy matters, he mainly 
takes into consideration his own personal views” 
Local roots: “originally lived in another part of the 
country and moved to your local area five years ago” 
Behavior: “spends on average 3 days of a working week 
working on local constituency issues and the remaining 2 
day reviewing and working on national policies in 
Parliament. When considering policy matters, he mainly 
takes into consideration his own personal views” 
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Table 2. Relative ratings of MP Nick by local roots and behavioral information treatments 
in Study 1. 
 
Conditioning effect of any 
behavioral localism information 
Separate conditioning effects for 
high and low behavioral localism  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.412
***
 -0.661
***
 -0.412
***
 -0.664
***
 
 
(0.057) (0.128) (0.057) (0.125) 
Local roots 0.755
***
 0.759
***
 0.755
***
 0.758
***
 
 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
Behavioral localism 
information 
0.683
***
 0.691
***
 
  
 
(0.078) (0.079) 
  
Behavioral localism: 
High (vs. no info)   
1.395
***
 1.402
***
 
   
(0.098) (0.098) 
Behavioral localism: 
Low (vs. no info)   
-0.007 -0.0002 
   
(0.085) (0.086) 
Local roots X 
Behavioral info. 
-0.253
**
 -0.257
**
 
  
 
(0.110) (0.110) 
  
Local roots X High 
behavioral localism   
-0.311
**
 -0.311
**
 
   
(0.140) (0.139) 
Local roots X Low 
behavioral localism   
-0.233
*
 -0.238
**
 
   
(0.119) (0.119) 
Controls for voter 
characteristics? 
No Yes No Yes 
Observations 5,203 5,203 5,203 5,203 
R
2
 0.036 0.046 0.107 0.116 
Adjusted R
2
 0.036 0.044 0.106 0.114 
Note: All models estimated via OLS. Dependent variable is respondent relative rating of MP 
Nick (the 0-10 rating of Nick minus that of Philip). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Figure 1. Effects of local roots conditional on behavioral information treatments (Study 1) 
 
 
Note: Column (a) shows the predicted relative rating of MP Nick (MP Nick rating minus MP 
Philip rating) as the MP local roots treatment varies and with all control variables held constant at 
their modal value in the sample. The top panel shows predicted values when respondents receive 
no information about MP behavioral localism. The second panel shows predicted values when 
respondents receive information about MP behavioral localism and Nick is revealed to be low in 
behavioral localism. The third panel shows predicted values when respondents receive 
information about MP behavioral localism and Nick is revealed to be high in behavioral localism. 
For each of the same behavioral localism conditions, the panels in column (b) show the estimated 
treatment effect of MP Nick having local roots. Estimates are calculated from Model 4 in Table 
2. Dots indicate point estimates. Lines denote 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2. Example screenshots from survey experiment (Study 2) 
 
 
 
  
35 
 
Figure 3. Estimated average marginal component effects (AMCEs), all MP attributes 
 
Note: Points show the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of each MP attribute level 
compared to the baseline level of the attribute, estimated via OLS regression with standard errors 
clustered by respondent. Bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals.   
 
 
